Titlebook: Satō, America and the Cold War; US-Japanese Relation Fintan Hoey Book 2015 Fintan Hoey 2015 Japan.United States.Cold War.Sat? Eisaku.nuclea

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itinerary

流出

Satō, America and the Cold War978-1-137-45763-9Series ISSN 2731-6807 Series E-ISSN 2731-6815

Anonymous

Introduction,hnocrat.. His background as a Railway Ministry bureaucrat, together with his manner, which could appear aloof and unfeeling, accounts for this image. He was also noted for his taciturnity and his often confusingly indirect mode of speaking.. However, he successfully led his country through a particu

Morbid

,Satō’s First Year in Power, 1964–1965,office China detonated a nuclear device. Grappling with security, particularly with the question of nuclear weapons, characterised Satō’s relations with the United States over the course of his tenure, as did the broader question of diplomatic recognition of China and its representation at the Unite

民間傳說(shuō)

integrated

enmesh

The Reversion of Okinawa, 1969, Part 2,behind-the-scenes facilitator and intermediary between Satō and Lyndon Johnson’s White House in the run-up to and during Satō’s meeting with Johnson in November 1967 (see Chapter 2). He undertook a similar function in advance of Satō’s meeting with Nixon in 1969, which culminated in the conclusion o

DAFT

吞下

,The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defence Policy, 1969–1971,, he gave an off-the-cuff address to assembled journalists in which he outlined his vision for the future of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. In light of the quagmire of Vietnam the United States would no longer commit ground troops to wars on the Asian mainland.. Instead, Nixon looked to Ame