Titlebook: Sanctions as Economic Statecraft; Theory and Practice Steve Chan (Professor of Political Science),A. Coo Book 2000 Palgrave Macmillan, a di

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The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes,t of them. Different theories of economic coercion emphasise different variables. These have included multilateral cooperation with the primary sender, the domestic political economy of the target country, the use of military statecraft as a complement to sanctions, the opportunity costs of sanction

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A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions,at sanctions can be successful in attaining their political objectives in the target country under certain circumstances if the sanctions impose significant costs on politically powerful segments of the target society.

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Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?,e security. The Italians, faced with such a mixed message, had little reason to believe the League would take any further action to redress their invasion. They were correct, and the League’s failure to act condemned not only the Ethiopians but also ultimately the League itself.

Repetitions

Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: An Overview, to represent a failed deterrence attempt by him to head off a military conflict with Sparta (Lenway, 1988). All were, however, in general agreement that the Megarian decree was a critical turning point in the events leading to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

后天習(xí)得

How and Whom the US President Sanctions: A Time-series Cross-section Analysis of US Sanction Decisi economic sanctions not only for the policy goals it claims but also for undeclared domestic reasons. The findings show that the president’s decision to use economic sanctions follows the decision to use military force very closely.

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