Titlebook: Russian Contributions to Game Theory and Equilibrium Theory; Theo S. H. Driessen,Gerard Laan,Elena B. Yanovskay Book 2006 Springer-Verlag

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0924-6126 lts obtained in the former Soviet Union between 1968 and 198V.A. Vasil’ev and E.B. Yanovskaya 1 Game theory in the USSR before 1990 In this introductory chapter ?rst a short historical information about the development of game theory in the USSR before the 1990s is given. It should help to understan

lavish

A probabilistic model of social choiceomatization is given for the probabilistic social choice rule such that, for every profile . of individual preferences, the binary relation .(.) on the set of random alternatives is generated by the expected bilinear skew-symmetric preference intensity function on the set of alternatives. Further, i

不在灌木叢中

Equilibrium points in general noncooperative games and their mixed extensionsnitions of different mixed extensions of these games are discussed, and the corresponding existence theorems are established. A connection between so defined mixed extensions and mixed extensions of noncooperative games with payoff functions is investigated.

gruelling

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反話

Cores and generalized NM-solutions for some classes of cooperative gameszed von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions for both TU-cooperative games and NTU-games, associated with pure exchange economies. Strong attention is paid to the accessibility of the cores via a dynamic process of subsequent improvements of dominated alternatives, as well as to the characterization of und

A簡潔的

洞察力

Stability of economic equilibriumrticipants can benefit from throwing out some of the commodities. Equilibria with this property are called .. Examples show that an equilibrium need not be stable even if it is unique and the preferences are defined by nice utility functions. In this paper we study stability from an infinitesimal po