Titlebook: Rethinking Popper; Zuzana Parusniková,Robert S. Cohen Conference proceedings 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Karl R. Popper

否決

Karl Popper and Hans Albert — The Broad Scope of Critical Rationalisms activities extends from expository endeavors to critical exchanges with the opponents; of the latter the best known being his early involvement in the so-called “Positivismusstreit”, covering a substantial part of the 1970s. However, Albert‘s role was never one of a mere apologist, his own scholar

卵石

他日關(guān)稅重重

Popper’s Theory of the Searchlight: A Historical Assessment of Its Significancehology. As I also pointed out in my book, and as has been mentioned by others as well, Otto Selz played a formative role in the rise of cognitive science in the early 1950s of the last century in the USA, notably the work of later Nobel laureates Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon. A mediating role h

過去分詞

From Group Selection to Ecological Nichesarious stages of development The chapter concludes with a possible application of that evolutionary theory, some thoughts about David Hume as the source of the differences between Popper and Hayek, and on the possible impact Popper‘s criticism had on Hayek‘s role in artificial intelligence.

艱苦地移動(dòng)

Conference proceedings 2009e of reason in the Western thought is being undermined, Popper’s non-foundationist model ofreason brings the Enlightenment message into a new perspective. Popper believed that the open society was vulnerable, due precisely to its tolerance of otherness.?This is a matter of great urgency in the moder

類似思想

Experience and Perceptual Belieflowing Popper, that experiences are reasons as well as causes for belief-acts, but not for belief-contents. This involves rejecting justificationism, the mistaken view that a reason for a belief-act must be a reason for its content. Popper‘s many critics presuppose justificationism, and so miss the

先鋒派

Callus

, — The Popperian Challengefoundationism, identifying reason with the duty and the privilege of grounding (proving or justifying) knowledge claims. His arguments against foundationism, as well as his proposed solution, can be tracked back to the dispute with Hume who, as Popper observes, drew the wrong conclusion from the fac

鎮(zhèn)痛劑

“Why, and to What Extent, May a False Hypothesis Yield the Truth?”trological, numerological and architectonic principles. By contrast, . (1609) is far more tightly argued on the basis of only a few dynamical principles. In the eyes of many, such a contrast embodies a transition from Renaissance to early modern science. I suggest that Karl Popper‘s fallibilist and

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