Titlebook: Resisting Economic Globalization; Critical Theory and David Schneiderman Book 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013 critical theory.democ

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Dedication

2947-9274 gal Studies series.International relevanceThere is at present much disenchantment with the rules governing international investment. Conceived as a set of disciplines establishing thresholds of tolerable state behaviour, dissatisfaction has precipitated acts of resistance in various parts of the wor

轉(zhuǎn)折點(diǎn)

Teubner and System Liberation,to speak (Foucault, 2008; Tribe, 2009, p. 694). This is the point of view promoted by neoliberal thinking and continues, to this day, to shape public policy in many states around the world. This is despite Polanyi’s insistence that disembedded markets are an impossibility; a ‘stark’ and unrealistic ‘utopia’ (Polanyi, 1944/2001, p. 3).

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Meditative

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Santos and the Difficulty of Sustainable Resistance,llo, 1987, p. 569). As has been noted by others (Weiss, 2005a; Sassen, 2006, p. 229), accompanying processes of deregulation are those of re-regulation. In an age of economic globalization, state functions do not entirely recede into the background, instead, states continue to play critical roles in the structuration of economic globalization.

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Book 2013f tolerable state behaviour, dissatisfaction has precipitated acts of resistance in various parts of the world..? .Resisting Economic Globalization. explores the magnitude of the legal constraints imposed by these rules and institutions associated with the worldwide spread of neoliberalism. Much con

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Introduction,t in almost every part of the world. It is not that states simply have disintegrated under the excessive weight of market ideology. States continue to perform critical functions in maintaining public infrastructures, facilitating economic flows, and policing dangers of various sorts. Rather, the pri

代理人

Hardt and Negri and the Immobilization of States, (?i?ek, 2009). The recipe for success called for less government and more markets. In the past, political authority was expected to check economic power on behalf of citizens seeking to protect themselves from the deleterious effects of markets (Polanyi, 1944/2001, pp. 79–80). Post-1989, political

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Teubner and System Liberation,trumentalities (Polanyi, 1944/2001, p. 60; Dale, 2010, p. 193). Eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberal economists sought to inverse this relationship, rendering politics subordinate to the logic of markets. If early liberalism was about having the economy act as an internal check on government, t