Titlebook: Remaking Monetary Policy in China; Markets and Controls Michael‘Beggs,Luke Deer Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s),

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Instruments II: The Evolution of Policy Strategy,rategy evolved. Here we first look at policy strategy for influencing the interbank market. We argue that policy control here was limited by the structural liquidity surplus discussed in the previous chapter, as well as by the fact that many Chinese banks did not tend to continuously optimise their

規(guī)章

Conclusion,comment on the legacy this period has left in Chinese monetary policy. The emergence of a Chinese form of ‘shadow banking’ reacted to banking controls, and seemed to undermine policy dependence on such direct measures. In the 2010s, policymakers reconfirmed their intent to deregulate bank interest r

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Transmission II: Liquidity and Lending,posits, but by the cost and availability of liquidity in the form of reserves. We discuss how this manifested in the Chinese financial system—not so much to explain how policy was able to use the bank liquidity constraint to manage lending, but to show why this was difficult in the 2000s.

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Instruments II: The Evolution of Policy Strategy, rates, but not control them outright. The lack of control over market rates, as well as uncertainty about transmission from interbank market conditions to bank lending behaviour, forced authorities to rely more heavily on direct banking controls to restrain credit and money expansion.

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Targets: Why Money and Credit?,t rates. We explain why Chinese officials continued to use quantitative targets: mainly as an anchor for tighter policy, rather than any belief in a stable demand-for-money function. Interest rates were not appropriate as an intermediate target because policymakers doubted their influence on investment.

過渡時(shí)期

Transmission I: Inside the Banking Black Box,e simple bank money multiplier approach, and the ‘industrial organisation’ framework treating banks as intermediaries of ‘funds’ between depositors and borrowers. Chinese policymakers rejected both of these ways of looking at policy transmission through banks.