| 書(shū)目名稱(chēng) | Relational Supply Contracts |
| 副標(biāo)題 | Optimal Concessions |
| 編輯 | Michaela Isabel H?hn |
| 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/827/826112/826112.mp4 |
| 概述 | Includes supplementary material: |
| 叢書(shū)名稱(chēng) | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems |
| 圖書(shū)封面 |  |
| 描述 | .Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contract is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2010 |
| 關(guān)鍵詞 | Buy-Back Contract; Quality-Improvement Efforts; Quantity Flexibility Contract; Relational Contract; Supp |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02791-8 |
| isbn_softcover | 978-3-642-02790-1 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-642-02791-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957 |
| issn_series | 0075-8442 |
| copyright | Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 |
|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋|
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