Titlebook: Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality; Essays in Honor of M Christian Coseru Book 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) a

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2211-1107 phical engagements with traditions outside the West. Their variety and breadth bear?testimony to the legacy of Siderits’ impact in?shaping the contemporary?conversation in Buddhist philosophy and its reverberat978-3-031-13997-0978-3-031-13995-6Series ISSN 2211-1107 Series E-ISSN 2211-1115

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But Aren’t We Conscious? A Buddhist Reflection on the Hard Problemhat we should be content to deal with how things appear. In this perspective, the task of explaining consciousness is neither to eliminate appearances à la Dennett nor to discover what the mind really is in itself, but to learn how to correlate better the various appearances though which the mental

Parabola

perpetual

The Curious Case of the Conscious Corpse: A Medieval Buddhist Thought Experimentluminating narrative, showing how the story is a classic example of a medieval Buddhist “thought experiment” (Gedankenspiel), which was freely altered by Buddhist authors as it was deployed in different doctrinal/philosophical contexts. I conclude with some reflections on how our approach to such di

EVADE

What’s in a Concept? Conceptualizing the Nonconceptual in Buddhist Philosophy and Cognitive Scienceonconceptual cognition” (.) marks the limits of conceptuality. But what precisely do “conceptual” and “nonconceptual” mean? Consider that “concept” is routinely used to translate the Sanskrit term, .; . is accordingly rendered as “nonconceptual.” But . has also been rendered as “imagination,” “discr

Credence

On Necessary Connection in Mental Causation––Nāgārjuna’s Master Argument Against the Sautrāntika-Vas necessary relation belong and why? If the latter, they need to explain how mental causation – a continuum of interrupted mental events in which the previous moment are causes and the subsequent moments effects – possible with intrinsic natures, absent any necessary causal connection between them? E

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A Post-Reductionist Buddhism?ke up the Madhyamaka critique of Buddhist reductionism and the philosophical consequences of the view that all things are empty (.) of inherent existence (.). If all things are empty, then arguably Abhidharma reductionism is undermined. That is, if everything is empty of inherent existence, then the

吞下

The , According to Madhyamaka, Or: Thoughts on Whether Mark Siderits and I Really Disagreest place intelligible. Siderits, then, would dispel his formulation’s air of paradox by taking it to mean, “it is ultimately true that no statement corresponds to the ultimate nature of reality.” I have taken the same statement as aptly expressing the contention, rather, that “it is ultimately true”

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Anti-Realism and Realism About the Past: A Present for Mark Sideritsnt selves, and the external world but even about consciousness. In this paper I try, first, to reconstruct such an anti-realism about the past using Vasubandhu’s critique of the omni-existentist (sarvāstivādin) early Buddhists, and then respond to it by bringing in Bhāsarvaj?a the Kashmir-Naiyāyika