Titlebook: Realism and Explanatory Priority; John Wright Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997 discourse.language.metaphysics.scie

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,The Evidence for Realism — II: The Evidence for Independence from Discourse,th the relation between Realism and . at all. In the first part of this book we called this form of opposition to Realism ‘conceptual-relativistic’ anti-Realism. Whereas the epistemic-truth anti-Realists were concerned to deny that truth is independent of our means of knowing, or verifying or confir

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Book 1997ired to establish Realism in any area. The author defends arestricted form of Realism, which he calls Nomic Structuralism. .The book will be suitable for professional philosophers of language,science and metaphysics, and their graduate students.

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0921-8599 uld berequired to establish Realism in any area. The author defends arestricted form of Realism, which he calls Nomic Structuralism. .The book will be suitable for professional philosophers of language,science and metaphysics, and their graduate students.978-90-481-4823-3978-94-017-2844-7Series ISSN 0921-8599 Series E-ISSN 2542-8349

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Epistemic Truth and the Explanation of Novel Confirmation,heory. On the face of it, the claim that the theory is true . would seem to be one possible explanation of such continued confirmation. But whether or not it is . possible explanation, it is certainly not obvious that it is the . possible explanation. The aim of this chapter is to consider whether t

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