Titlebook: Rationality and Equilibrium; A Symposium in Honor Charalambos D. Aliprantis,Rosa L. Matzkin,Nicholas Conference proceedings 2006 Springer-V

擴大

extrovert

Log-concave probability and its applications,bility functions, and their integrals. We list a large number of commonly-used probability distributions and report the log-concavity or log-convexity of their density functions and their integrals. We also discuss a variety of applications of log-concavity that have appeared in the literature.

擁擠前

Conference proceedings 2006o-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.

Retrieval

Revealed stochastic preference: a synthesis,re consistent with a hypothesis of maximization of preference preorders by members of the population. This is a population analog of the classical revealed preference problem in economic consumer theory. This paper synthesizes the solutions to this problem that have been obtained by Marcel K. Richte

消耗

,Communication in dynastic repeated games: ‘Whitewashes’ and ‘coverups’,place them in an infinitely repeated game. Each individual is unable to observe what happens before his entry in the game. Past information is therefore conveyed from one cohort to the next by means of communication..When communication is costless and messages are sent simultaneously, communication

諷刺滑稽戲劇

The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games,tions and quasi-concave in own actions. I show that a no-improper-crossing condition is both necessary and sufficient for a finite subset . of [0, 1] × [0, 1] to be the set of Nash equilibria of such a game.

蛛絲

Fecal-Impaction

生氣的邊緣

Colonnade