Titlebook: Rational Interaction; Essays in Honor of J Reinhard Selten Book 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1992 Nicht-kooperative Spiele.Non-co

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Equilibrium Selection by Unilateral Deviation Stabilityith two strict equilibria. This paper tries to generalize this approach. Our concept of unilateral deviation stability gives priority to risks of unilateral deviations, i.e. deviations from an intended behavior by single players. We investigate the general properties of unilateral deviation stability and consider some crucial examples.

SIT

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The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Paymentsve as much as possible the consistency property of the Shapley value for TU games, in the sense of [Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989]. It turned out that the new value resulted from an intuitive dynamic process which was interesting also for the class of TU games. Unfortunately, the class of NTU games was

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Types Decomposition and Perfect Implementations are personal (independently drawn with private valuations of actions). An outcome in a personal-types Bayesian environment is perfectly implementable, if and only if it is Nash implementable. These observations are shown to be immediate consequences of a general types decomposition theorem regardin

Compatriot

Fair Division under Asymmetric Informationrights to it. Different persons value the object differently and each person only knows his own value exactly. The question is who should get the object and by how much this person should compensate the others in order to guarantee a fair and efficient allocation. After having shown that several wel

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Equilibrium Selection by Unilateral Deviation Stabilityons of solutions. HARSANYI and SELTEN have suggested a set of convincing axioms which allows to select a unique solution in all 2 × 2-bimatrix games with two strict equilibria. This paper tries to generalize this approach. Our concept of unilateral deviation stability gives priority to risks of unil

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