Titlebook: Politics of Favoritism in Public Procurement in Turkey; Reconfigurations of Esra ?eviker Gürakar Book 2016 The Editor(s) (if applicable) a

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Esra ?eviker Gürakareconomic models, such as the input-output model, economic agents (producers, consumers, etc.) were assumed to react mechanically and passively to stimuli coming from endogenous economic shocks and/or government policies. One (notable) exception in the treatment of expectations in the first half of t

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Esra ?eviker Gürakaroral economics, which evaluates economic policies based on fThis book is intended as a textbook for a course in behavioral economics for advanced undergraduate and graduate students who have already learned basic economics. The book will also be useful for introducing behavioral economics to researc

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Esra ?eviker Gürakar,Tuba Bircanoral economics, which evaluates economic policies based on fThis book is intended as a textbook for a course in behavioral economics for advanced undergraduate and graduate students who have already learned basic economics. The book will also be useful for introducing behavioral economics to researc

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Esra ?eviker Gürakaric economics. The book will also be useful for introducing behavioral economics to researchers. Unlike some general audience books that discuss behavioral economics, this book does not take a position of completely negating traditional economics. Its position is that both behavioral and traditional

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,Politics of Government–Business Relations in Turkey: Deep-Rooted Structures and New Tensions, relations. State–business relations have also changed with the Islamist and conservative elements dominating the interactions among particular government and private sector actors. When religion has become an important component of forming “connections” with the government, the nascent devout busin

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Political Economy of Reform and Retrogression in the Public Procurement System: Third Party Enforcement Versus the Political Settlement in Turkey, to many irregular and illegal practices and paved the way for corrupt transfers. With the pull of the EU–IMF–WB nexus, a new PPL that enforced transparency, competitiveness, accountability, and de-politicization was enacted in 2003. Yet, when the domestic political settlement has changed with the t

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Redistribution or Crony Capitalism? Favoritism in Public Procurement Contract Award Processes,e yearly total of high-value public procurements, as the major area of transfers controlled by the government, has tripled in eight years. This development went hand in hand with unceasing legal amendments that increased the share of procurements that fall under the less transparent and less competi

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