Titlebook: Politics as Rational Action; Essays in Public Cho Leif Lewin,Evert Vedung Book 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980 P

Manifest

Individual and Collective Rationality,mple in Coser (1956), Rae and Taylor (1970), where it is supposed that the cross cutting of the various groups ‘ties the society together’. The interaction of these groups is presumed to generate a natural equilibrium for society; one that is somehow just and desirable (Downs, 1957).

TIA742

liposuction

oice as the central topic of study, rational choice theorists set out to specify what alter- native an actor should prefer if he has some given knowledge of the conse- quences of each alternative and wants to see his preference system as fully realized as possible. But rational choice theory is not

值得贊賞

Political Trust as Rational Choice, each seeking to realize his or her own goals. Rational choice theory, as this notion is called, is, in fact, the contemporary successor of institutionalism, on the one hand, and pluralism, on the other, which are the approaches to political science that dominated in the first half of this century.

outer-ear

,On ‘Normative’ Rational-Choice Theories of Politics,es, including the assumption (usually tacit) that these preferences do not change with time. This assumption of fixed preference . be appropriate in the case of explanatory theories of social phenomena which are narrowly confined in place and especially time. For example if one wanted to explain the

Ige326

Political Aspects of Economic Power: A Critique of the Market Concept, empirical study of a major area of politics, which seems to be neglected thus far in political science proper: the intercorporate structures in economic life, their linkages with state and government and their most important and conspicuous actor, the giant industrial, commercial, or financial corp

宴會(huì)

MAL

Individual and Collective Rationality,lf interest (Bentley, 1949; Dahl, 1956). Fundamental to this conception is the presumption that these groups cut across one another along many different cleavages and hence nullify any sweeping classification of society into rigidly fixed classes or groups (Truman, 1951). This is articulated for exa

厭惡

lesion

When are Decision-Makers Irrational? Some Methodological Problems Related to the Analysis of Political Decision-Making,ty? This particular question has been discussed for a long period of time but can be said to have been accentuated by the progress made in the field of decision theory. The temptation to apply these new constructs to political decisions directly has been great. But the difficulties have been just as