Titlebook: Political Credibility and Economic Development; Silvio Borner,Aymo Brunetti,Beatrice Weder Book 1995 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Mac

enamel

書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development被引頻次




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development年度引用




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development讀者反饋




書目名稱Political Credibility and Economic Development讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

botany

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24049-4Developing Countries; development; East Asia; Economic Development; economic growth; growth; democracy

擋泥板

Catching Up or Falling Behind?This chapter analyses the cross-country growth experience of LDCs and compares it with the predictions of growth theory. The main message will be that the puzzle of why many LDCs fail to keep pace with economic development can be resolved by analysing their political systems.

Frenetic

Political Credibility and Economic Growth: The Empirical EvidenceThis chapter will provide empirical evidence for the growth effects of political credibility. Our indicator of political credibility will be used to test two central and interrelated propostions.

原諒

justment programs failed to deliver growth dividends? This book shows that there is a common and valid answer: political credibility defined as the predictability of the institutional rules of the game. This case is not only argued theoretically but also found to be confirmed by empirical analysis.

深陷

Contend

尊重

Osteoarthritis

Political Credibility: A Crucial Factor for Growthir idiosyncrasies: direct and indirect democracy, the paradoxes of voting and so on. The image of a benevolent dictator underlies many economists’ political framework. Others take the malevolent or self-serving dictator as their point of reference.

阻擋

Book 1995rograms failed to deliver growth dividends? This book shows that there is a common and valid answer: political credibility defined as the predictability of the institutional rules of the game. This case is not only argued theoretically but also found to be confirmed by empirical analysis. Ten case s