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Titlebook: Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms; An Empirical Analysi Pascal Engel Book 2015 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015

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書目名稱Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms
副標(biāo)題An Empirical Analysi
編輯Pascal Engel
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/706/705158/705158.mp4
概述Study in the field of economic sciences.Includes supplementary material:
叢書名稱Familienunternehmen und KMU
圖書封面Titlebook: Outside Director Compensation in German Public Family Firms; An Empirical Analysi Pascal Engel Book 2015 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015
描述Pascal Engel investigates how outside directors are incentivized in family firms that are publicly listed but still partly owned by members of the founding family. Owning families significantly influence their firms‘ corporate conduct with their own set of goals, sometimes in conflict with economically driven goals of the capital markets. The author analyzes how family shareholders exert their influence on compensation schemes of outside directors who have the difficult task to protect the interests of family and non-family shareholders. This book provides insights on current approaches of defining a compensation scheme that attracts qualified outside directors but concurrently reflects respective shareholders‘ preferences.
出版日期Book 2015
關(guān)鍵詞Compensation; Family Firms; Outside Directors; Pay Level; Pay Mix; Shareholder
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07316-9
isbn_softcover978-3-658-07315-2
isbn_ebook978-3-658-07316-9Series ISSN 2520-1174 Series E-ISSN 2520-1182
issn_series 2520-1174
copyrightSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015
The information of publication is updating

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,Appreciating Monitoring Activities – An Analysis of Outside Director Compensation in Public Family irm‘s management. This study investigates the impact of family representation on outside director compensation, based on a firm‘s monitoring need. We complement classical agency theory with stewardship theory and the perspective of socioemotional wealth to account for particularities regarding the t
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Voluntary Disclosure of Individual Outside Director Compensation in Public Family Firms,ors take a central role in corporate governance. The decision to voluntarily disclose their individual compensation induces confidence in the family firm‘s governance system but also contradicts a family‘s endeavors to keep exclusive control. Using the socioemotional wealth based FIBER model, we inv
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2520-1174 family firms that are publicly listed but still partly owned by members of the founding family. Owning families significantly influence their firms‘ corporate conduct with their own set of goals, sometimes in conflict with economically driven goals of the capital markets. The author analyzes how fa
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