Titlebook: Other Human Beings; David Cockburn Book 1990 David Cockburn 1990 human beings.metaphysics.philosophy

Loathe

Scepticism, Dualism and Actionngs that, for example, feel pain, get angry, act and see. The problem might be presented in the form of the question: what justification do I have for taking these beings that I see around me to be people? The question, in its traditional form, assumes that there is a crucial contrast with regard to

消毒

加強(qiáng)防衛(wèi)

Justification and the First Personh develops the more complex range of reactions of adult human beings to each other. It responds to another’s smile, looks into another’s eyes, seeks the comfort of physical contact and so on. What the child observes of the other is, by itself, enough to bring forth the response. Further, responses o

紅腫

Arbitrarinessetween my thought of these beings that I see around me as people and my having towards them the attitude which I characteristically do. Now the situation for the approach discussed in my previous chapter is, in fact, rather worse than the closing remarks of that chapter might suggest. It is not simp

節(jié)省

The Mind and the Bodyhe light of the familiar idea that we should mark my thought about other people off from my thought about, say, stones by saying that I believe that the former, but not the latter, ‘have minds’. In Part I my emphasis was on the suggestion that we should think of what is basic in our thought about ot

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Human Beings and Scienced in the first person point of view. My argument shares that much — an emphasis on the third-person point of view — with the most dominant lines of thought in current philosophy of mind. Beyond that, however, there are quite fundamental differences. First, and most obviously, the focus of my interes

dyspareunia

Human Beings and Homo Sapiensuestion at its centre my approach contrasts sharply, in at least two ways, with philosophical discussions which take as their fundamental question ‘What is a person?’ First, my choice of the term ‘human being’ is, of course, closely tied up with the central importance which my discussion gives to th

Coronary

費(fèi)解

accessory

Personal Identity and the First Person which the idea of this as being a particular individual enters into our thought about another and have said nothing about the role which my conception of . as a particu-lar individual with a particular history plays in my thought. Now while this is clearly a major gap in my discussion it will be fe