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Titlebook: Optical and Wireless Technologies; Proceedings of OWT 2 Manish Tiwari,Ravi Kumar Maddila,Preecha Yupapin Conference proceedings 2022 The Ed

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樓主: FARCE
51#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 08:49:12 | 只看該作者
52#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 16:16:52 | 只看該作者
Manish Jangid,Ankur Saharia,Nitesh Mudgal,Sajai Vir Singh,Ghanshyam Singhoal is to match up two agents (either from different “gender” (this is .) or “unrestricted” (this is .)), Knuth?[1976] triggered the study of three- or multidimensional cases. Here, we focus on the study of ., known to be .-hard since the early?1990’s. Many .-hardness results, however, rely on very
53#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 16:39:51 | 只看該作者
Manan Gupta,Ashok Kumar,Amrita Dixit,Arjun Kumarroportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that Walrasian equilibria maximize the sum of agent valuations. This ensures efficiency, but can lead to extreme inequality across individuals. Many real-world markets – especially for water – use . pricing instead, often known
54#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 21:13:22 | 只看該作者
55#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 03:51:16 | 只看該作者
Vani Sadadiwala,Kashish Mahindroo,Vimlesh Singh,Priyanka Bansal,Sarthak Singhal. [EC’16] demonstrated the existence of optimal dynamic prices for unit-demand buyers, and showed a market with coverage valuations that admits no such prices. However, finding the most general class of markets (i.e., valuation functions) that admit optimal dynamic prices remains an open problem. In
56#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 07:53:52 | 只看該作者
Romesh Srivastava,Aparna Parameswaran,Hrishikesh S. Sonalikarssibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we assume that the seller has a very restricted knowledge of this prior: they only know the mean . and an upper bound . on the standard deviation of each item’s marginal distribution. Our goal is to design mechanisms
57#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 12:29:16 | 只看該作者
58#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 14:50:00 | 只看該作者
Harsha Prabha Paliwal,Navneet Agrawal,Suruti Guptaroportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that Walrasian equilibria maximize the sum of agent valuations. This ensures efficiency, but can lead to extreme inequality across individuals. Many real-world markets – especially for water – use . pricing instead, often known
59#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 21:22:43 | 只看該作者
Smart Parking Management System in Smart City,traffic trends and parking systems become as efficient and automated too. The aim of this paper is to acknowledge the increasing traffic, unorganized parking, and the time wasted while searching for a parking spot in an urban high vehicle density area and make an efficient parking system to avoid th
60#
發(fā)表于 2025-4-1 00:25:42 | 只看該作者
,Study of Microstrip Antenna Geometry: Effect of Antenna Geometry on Antenna Parameters—A Comprehens, and different physical parameters of the antenna can be altered and optimized for a particular application or for particular operating frequencies. In this article, effect of antenna geometry (specifically rectangular, circular, triangular, elliptical, trapezium, pentagonal and hexagonal shapes ar
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