Titlebook: Nonlinear Phenomena; Proceedings of the C K. B. Wolf Conference proceedings 1983 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983 Hamiltonian.differe

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書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena被引頻次




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena年度引用




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena讀者反饋




書目名稱Nonlinear Phenomena讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

CHASM

Wobbling kinks in ,, and sine-Gordon theory,es explicitly. Then we prove that the formal series actually is asymptotic for a rahter long time [. (. ln(1/ε)), for a certain .]. Finally, we construct an exact 3-soliton solution of the sine-Gordon equation that also has the properties of a wobbling kink. For the sine-Gordon equation, the wobbling kink seems to be mildly unstable.

BROTH

Solition models of long internal waves,internal waves of small but finite amplitude, propagating in one direction. In this paper, theories are tested experimentally by comparing measured and theoretical soliton shapes. The KdV equation predicts the shapes of our measured solitons with remarkable accuracy, much better than does the finite

landmark

Wobbling kinks in ,, and sine-Gordon theory, degree of freedom. In this paper we develop a formal perturbation series for the wobbling kink in .. theory, and give the first two terms in the series explicitly. Then we prove that the formal series actually is asymptotic for a rahter long time [. (. ln(1/ε)), for a certain .]. Finally, we constr

CESS

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犬儒主義者

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原諒

Francesco Calogeroinstitutions because of contagious fears regarding the solvency and liquidity of the financial system. The banking panics of 1931 and 1933 showed that the Federal Reserve System, inspired by the panic of 1907 and intended to be a lender of last resort, was not a solution. Furthermore, bank failures

Neuralgia

Ling-Lie Chauinstitutions because of contagious fears regarding the solvency and liquidity of the financial system. The banking panics of 1931 and 1933 showed that the Federal Reserve System, inspired by the panic of 1907 and intended to be a lender of last resort, was not a solution. Furthermore, bank failures