Titlebook: Neural Machines: A Defense of Non-Representationalism in Cognitive Neuroscience; Matej Kohár Book 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and T

不適當(dāng)

lesion

懶惰民族

Mechanistic Explanatory Texts, along the lines of Craver and Kaplan. However, I show that Craver and Kaplan’s view leads to four problems: the Contrasts in Ontology problem, the problem of Identifying Relevant Switch-Points, the problem of Single-Model Explanation and the problem of Empirical Adequacy. I show that the problems c

ASTER

Representations and Mechanisms Do Not Mix,and distinguishing it from person-level mental representation, I argue that a truly representational explanation requires that the content of neural representations be explanatorily relevant. I then argue that this is inconsistent with the requirements for mechanistic constitution, and consequently

deriver

狂熱語言

Structural Contents,itive phenomena. After introducing structural representations, I argue that while there are superficial differences in structuralist theories of representational content, the paradigm cases of structural representation are best understood if the content-determining relation is viewed liberally as si

思想上升

Teleosemantics,ons of cognitive phenomena. I note that most teleosemantic theories of content rely on indicator relations or structural similarity in addition to teleofunctions. As such, they inherit the issues with constitutive relevance inherent to indicator semantics and structuralist semantics. I furthermore s

Irascible

The Dual-Explananda Defence,ly mechanistically and must be explained representationally instead. I term this view the dual-explananda defence. I identify two types of dual explananda: (1) fittingness – the fact that particular mechanisms are well suited for particular cognitive tasks and not others; and (2) success: the fact t

LAY

土坯

Conclusions and Future Directions,planations – for both mainstream cognitive neuroscience and for pre-existing non-representational alternatives. I argue that for mainstream cognitive neuroscience, this book has shown representations to be of little importance, and that mechanistic explanatory texts should not mention representation