Titlebook: Metaphysics of Morality; Christopher B. Kulp Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 metaethics.morality.moral anti

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Truth, Facts, and Properties,that obtains, namely, that it is wrong for Smith to strike Jones. Types of states of affairs are determined by the types of properties characterizing those states of affairs. Moral states of affairs are “moral” because they instance moral properties, which supervene on physical properties.

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Moral Properties,ding first-order moral truth—is truth relative to one very special possible world, viz., the . world. The chapter ends with an analysis and critique of moral naturalism, and develops a version of moral non-naturalism, which includes a defense of the gradeablity of first-order moral properties.

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turalistic moral realism.Defends a subtle but broadly common.This is a book on metaethics—in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality.? After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a

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Why Metaphysics and Morality?, disagree. Epistemic moral skeptics think that even if there are moral truths, we can’t know them; metaphysical moral skeptics think that there is nothing to know—at least no “objective” moral truths. This book deals with metaphysical moral skepticism. Commonsense morality is committed to objective

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Truth, Facts, and Properties,he world is,” whether in non-moral or moral contexts. True propositions express facts, but false propositions do not. Facts are states of affairs that obtain, and true propositions expresses such states of affairs. Thus, ‘It is wrong for Smith to strike Jones’, if true, expresses a state of affairs

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Moral Properties,versals which may or may not be instantiated, or instantiable, in concrete or abstract particulars. The concept of a possible world—an imaginary ordered-set of compossible properties—is used to elucidate a realist conception of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties. On our view, truth—inclu