Titlebook: Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind; Essays in Honor of G Joshua P. Hochschild,Turner C. Nevitt,

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Knowing Non-existent Natures: A Problem for Aquinas’s Semantics of Essencewe can answer the second question without answering the first, knowing a thing’s essence without knowing whether it exists. This claim is part of a famous argument for the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures, and for the existence of God. But in his later commentaries on Aris

Intend

dendrites

Truth and Person in Aquinas’s , i.e., that “true” and “good” are transcendental terms convertible with “being.” I argue that the primary implication that Aquinas draws from this principle is that material creatures are not only intrinsically true and good, but that, in being so, they mediate a personal reality insofar as materia

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尾隨

Truth as a Transcendentalosophy. The paper begins with a brief survey of analytic views about truth. Then, after setting out the Scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals in general, it explains how truth in particular fits into it, with special attention to the Scholastic distinction between logical truth and ontological

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Four Notes on the Grammar of Ockham’s Mental Languagely related passages: . V, 8 and . I, 3. In the present paper, I discuss four riddles that are raised by these two texts: (1) I point to an apparent anomaly in the structure of . I, 3 and I propose an amendment to the St. Bonaventure edition in this regard; (2) I argue that Ockham’s main grammatical

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INCH

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