Titlebook: Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics; H. J. McCloskey Book 1969 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1969 ethics.Kant.moral judgments.mor

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Introductory: Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics and Moralityblems as: ‘Ought I really to tell him the truth when it is simply going to make him miserable?’, ‘What kinds of things and actions are good and obligatory?’, ‘What am I doing when I make a moral judgment?’ Although the conclusions arrived at on one level may bear on those of other levels, it is usef

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Theistic and Naturalistic Meta-Ethical Theorieshical theory must give account. Its secondary purpose is to indicate the sorts of considerations which tell against a number of important theories, and, on the basis of which these theories must be rejected. Because not all actual and possible theories (and refinements of them) can be examined here,

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Intuitionism: How We Come to Gain Moral Knowledgecome to gain moral knowledge. The usual intuitionist answer, and that which I suggest is the right answer, is that we discover general truths about goods and obligations by direct insight, by rational apprehension of them. These truths are self-evident in the sense that they may be directly apprehen

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Intrinsic Goodschecked and reflected upon by consideration of possible exceptions. However, the considerations pointed to in this chapter are such of which those who hold any sort of subjectivist ethic would be inclined to take account.

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Monistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Utilitarianismheories are basically meta-ethical theories which suggest that all concepts can be explained in terms of and reduced to one concept, and that to a natural phenomenon. It has been argued in . that such meta-theories are mistaken. However, monistic theories can be advanced purely as normative theories

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