Titlebook: Merleau-Ponty‘s "Phenomenology of Perception"; A Guide and Commenta Monika M. Langer Book 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan

dry-eye

Overview: This book aims to guide its reader through the notorious difficulties of Merleau-Pony‘s famous "Phenomenology of Perception". The author contextualizes, reconstructs, clarifies and, where necessary, completes Merleau-Ponty‘s analyses chapter by chapter.978-0-333-45291-2978-1-349-19761-3

Haphazard

Ischemic-Stroke

The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiologythe modification or collapse of figure-background structures. Consequently, modern physiology itself replaced the mechanistic stimulus-response model with the notion of an organism which meets and relates to stimulation in a variety of ways. Since the stimulation of a sense organ did not in and of i

谷類

The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychologybject; the angle from which we perceive our body is unalterable. Yet this permanent and invariable presence of our body is what enables us to observe objects; it is the prerequisite for the latters’ variability and potential absence. Once again, the dialectical relationship between freedom and depen

表被動

The Body in its Sexual Beinghile it is true that we can experience our body in this fashion, we have seen that such experience is abnormal, and that it is itself based on a primordial experience of the body as pre-objectively present to the world. At this pre-objective level, there is a fundamental dialectic, a to-and-fro move

動脈

愚笨

Sensingereas the empiricist overlooks his own role in his analysis of perception, the intellectualist accords himself a role which makes his lived perception equally incomprehensible while depending upon it just as surely. The empiricist leaves no room for consciousness; the intellectualist subordinates ev

裂口

The Thing and the Natural Worldty comes to be only as orientated being for a bodily gaze or ‘grip’. In short, we saw that lived spatiality is inseparable from objectivity, since such spatiality is the means whereby we recognize and are aware of objects as objects. We saw that objects are always objects for us — but that this ‘us’

ornithology

Others and the Human World independence; they are inthemselves for us. Things have a constancy, an identity; yet we have seen that it is not a matter of their possessing stable inert properties. Rather, the thing’s identity is a dynamic ‘style of existence’ which emerges in the way in which that thing invites, and responds t

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