Titlebook: Medical Decision Making; A Health Economic Pr Stefan Felder,Thomas Mayrhofer Textbook 2022Latest edition Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part

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Test and Treatment Decisions,cide (again) under uncertainty whether to not use a test, to test and act according to the test results (i.e., treat if the test result is positive and abstain from treatment if the test result is negative), or to treat directly without a test. Under these circumstances, the core descriptive concept

medieval

Prudence and Medical Decision Making,es to the sick state only and is assumed to be exogenous. Unlike the diagnostic risk, it cannot be affected by the treatment decision. With this kind of risk underlying the test and treatment decisions, the notion of prudence becomes relevant. We demonstrate that prudent decision makers act even ear

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The Optimal Cutoff of a Diagnostic Test,ion maker by setting a cut-off value. A good example is the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test for the detection of prostate cancer in men. The analysis of a blood sample results in a PSA value, which the physician assesses as either positive or negative depending on the chosen cut-off value. We d

formula

The Total Value of Information of a Test,st and one a perfect one. The utility index depends on the prior probability of disease, and its maximum is equal to the Youden index. It also has similarities to the net-benefit of a test, an approach that is used in the decision curve analysis. We also present the concept of the total value of inf

considerable

The Economics of Medical Decision Making,onger available for other purposes. Like benefits and harms, the costs of medical services influence the test and treatment thresholds and will affect medical decisions. We study two versions. The QALY approach includes only health in the decision makers’ utility function. Commensurability between t

integrated

Valuing Health and Life,ts. The health-survival model allows us to formalize the willingness to pay for health and life. After characterizing individual choices within these models, we analyze the allocation chosen by a social planner who maximizes ‘the greatest good of the greatest number.’ We conclude the chapter by comp

譏笑

Gudgeon

Imperfect Agency and Non-expected Utility Models,ts. Specifically, we assume that physicians internalize only a share of the patient’s utility and follow a profit motive in their test and treatment decisions. We then analyze the effects of imperfect agency on the thresholds and discuss the role of liability rules and medical guidelines subject to