Titlebook: Measurement in Public Choice; Steinar Str?m Book 1981 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1981 boundary element method.measurement.publi

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When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?rates of substitution for the public good are symmetrically distributed in the voting population. In general however, even if preferences are identical and tax shares equal, majority voting is not Pareto efficient if income is asymmetrically distributed. Here we formalize and generalize Bowen’s theo

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Professed Inequality Aversion and Its Error Component we asked 123 students to consider various ways of allocating fellowships to two hypothetical recipients. Each questionnaire consisted of a series of binary choice experiments, which led the respondents to disclose the amounts of equally distributed income they considered equivalent to two reference

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Optimization and Quantitative Assessment of Child Allowancesect taxation in a previous paper, are adopted to explore whether child allowances in Norway are optimal given these welfare weights. A set of optimality conditions—which may be interesting in their own right—is established, and economic interpretations are presented. The empirical results indicate t

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Issues in the Measurement of Povertyct operations, viz. . (who are the poor?) and . (how are the poverty characteristics of different people to be combined into an aggregate measure?). The nature of the exercise of poverty measurement is examined in Section I. Section II is devoted to the identification issue, including the fixation o

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