Titlebook: Meaning and Analysis: New Essays on Grice; Klaus Petrus Book 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2010 comm

泄露

充氣女

Speaker-Meaning, Conversational Implicature and Calculability,ization do not apply to the Calculability Criterion. We are, then, still left with a conflict between Speaker Meaning Exhaustiveness and key Gricean claims about conversational implicature. At the end of this chapter, I explore ways of resolving this conflict.

馬賽克

ALIAS

On Three Theories of Implicature: Default Theory, Relevance Theory and Minimalism,ems. If this is right then there is a reason to look for a third alternative and in conclusion I’ll suggest that it is the approach emerging from so-called . which is best placed to accommodate Grice’s fundamental distinction between what a sentence means and what utterances of it implicate.

沉默

enumaerate

Contextualism in the Philosophy of Language,he claims that:.Her opponent, on the other hand, will advocate a formal semantic approach to meaning and insist that deriving the proposition expressed by a sentence is a purely syntactic-semantic enterprise. He will, therefore, tend to agree with Emma Borg that:

MINT

Some Aspects of Reasons and Rationality,f them ‘Some aspects of reasons and rationality’. It looks most closely at the relation of practical reasons to rationality, and provides the basis for the ideas developed here. This chapter takes as its focus one particular claim and the arguments that support it: rationality is displayed in a wider variety of actions than those done for reasons.

Optometrist

2946-2576 aning, communicative actions, conversational implicatures, the semantics-pragmatics distinction and recent debates concerning minimalist versus contextualist semantics.978-1-349-36773-3978-0-230-28211-7Series ISSN 2946-2576 Series E-ISSN 2946-2584

天賦

,Intuition, the Paradigm Case Argument, and the Two Dogmas of Kant’otelianism,5) provide a Gricean and Chomskyan defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I shall also examine critically Saul Kripke’s famous ‘a(chǎn)rgument from linguistic intuition’ in defence of essential properties. It too is a form of the Paradigm Case Argument in the Gricean fashion. I shall argue that th

PANEL

Grice on Presupposition,onian presuppositions. In the first section, I lay out Grice’s arguments for this conclusion. In the following section, I argue that all of Grice’s observations can be accommodated within a presuppositionalist framework. However, we will see that there are two rather different ways of characterizing