Titlebook: Mathematics and Politics; Strategy, Voting, Po Alan D. Taylor Textbook 19951st edition Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 1995 Accessibility.Ca

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More Yes-No Voting,) trade between . winning coalitions can never simultaneously render both losing. Recall that in showing that the procedure to amend the Canadian constitution is not trade robust we needed only two winning coalitions.

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Political Power,uggest that if I have three times as many votes as you (and majority rule is still being used in the sense of “majority of votes” being needed for passage), then I have three times as much power as you have. The following hypothetical example should suffice to call this intuition (or this use of the word .) into question.

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Social Choice,democratically among several alternatives only in situations where no alternative has an advantage built in by the rules of the voting system. In yes-no voting systems, as we’ve seen, the status quo often has such a built-in advantage.

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More Escalation,ed-bid auction” or a “Vickrey auction.” In ., we explain the sense in which a Vickrey auction is a “generalized Prisoners Dilemma.” Finally in the conclusion, we compare the degree to which the two theorems are truly normative. (Briefly, the former requires the knowledge that one s opponent is rational; the latter does not.)