Titlebook: Mathematical Economics and Game Theory; Essays in Honor of O Rudolf Henn,Otto Moeschlin Conference proceedings 1977 Springer-Verlag Berlin

Interjection

書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory被引頻次




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory年度引用




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory讀者反饋




書目名稱Mathematical Economics and Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

Panther

Vers Une Theorie Generale des Jeux Positionnelsgit de démontrer l’existence d’une stratégie gagnante. L’objet de cette note est de montrer que les concepts classiques de la Théorie des Hypergraphes sont des outils bien adaptés pour ce genre de théorème; à la lumière de ces résultats nous passerons en revue les jeux positionnels qui ont retenu ré

expository

歌曲

佛刊

averse

The Existence Problem for Solutionsction form. The most basic and most challenging theoretical question regarding this theory concerns whether their solution sets exist. It has been known [5] since 1967 that such solutions need not exist in the most general case of all games. However, all known counterexamples are of a rather special

AXIOM

Remark on the Transfer Operator and the Value-Equilibrium Equivalence Hypothesist game its side payment version and to each exchange market its transferable utility version..The second concept is “l(fā)inear transformation of the utility scale”..Both operators do not commute. It is shown that Shapley value as well as Walras equilibrium may be obtained in the non-side payment situat

NIP

Enervate

上坡

An N-Person Bargaining Game in the Extensive Forms question, no satisfactory answer has been found. As pointed out by e. g. Coddington (1973) all theories presented so far either do not lead to a determinate solution for any situation of interest or involve some kind of erroneous expectations as regards the opponent’s behavior.