Titlebook: Markets, Games, and Organizations; Essays in Honor of R Tatsuro Ichiishi,Thomas Marschak Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 G

助記

Roy Radner and incentive theory,e subject of incentive theory. The theory has normative force whenever, metaphorically speaking, the invisible hand of the market fails to provide such motivation automatically. Market failure can come about either because markets are imperfect in some way or because they do not exist at all. Indeed

ventilate

Sufficient conditions for Nash implementation,constructing a game that implements the objective in Nash equilibrium. The first step specifies the strategy set of the game and three properties of the game rule that are together sufficient to insure Nash implementation of the objective. The second step is the explicit construction of a game that

HEDGE

Majority rule with dollar voting, any coalition with more than half the wealth can take everything. Only extreme concentrations of wealth, in which one player owns everything or two players each own half the total wealth are undominated, and thus constitute the core. However, the stable set (von Neumann-Morgenstern solution) is sig

EVICT

Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution,is reached. I show that as the cost of delay shrinks to zero, the subgame perfect payoff converges to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution with weights determined by the relative discount rates of the players. I also establish conditions for the uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium for a

盟軍

Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment,anced through distortionary taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is time inconsistent. We therefore introduce explicitly the constraint that at no point in time the revision of the original tax plan is desirable. We completely characterize the (third best) tax pl

craving

享樂主義者

obstinate

Survival and the art of profit maximization,edly through random matching. An explicit criterion (“bankruptcy”) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are presumed to be aware of this criterion. Survival in each interaction depends on two factors: the strategies agents adopt when they interact, and the wealth levels the

dendrites

STIT

Rose-Anne Danathe Technical University of Munich, Garching, W. Germany from 22-26 August 1988. The major focus of the workshop was to evaluate critically the progress made in the area of metal-semiconductor interfaces. The underlying theme was the mechanism of Schottky barrier formation and a serious as- sessment