Titlebook: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information; An Experimental Stud Wolfgang Ryll Book 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

Critical

The Game-Theoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets,revious random choices and choices of the other player, the analysis can later be based on the normal form. In section 2.2 we describe the Bayesian Nash equilibrium points of the normal form game in pure strategies. In section 2.3, finally, we apply elimination of weakly dominated strategies as an a

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Experimental Design and Organisation of the Experiment,ty, we will adopt the following terminology: (1) Session: A sequence of periods involving the same group of subjects who play the game on the same day. (2) Play: A unique configuration of treatment variables of a group of sessions. We distinguish between first, second and third play in order to spec

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Experimental Results,f’s bargaining position. Furthermore, we distinguish between first, second and third play. We call subjects who have never played the game before and participate in the first play inexperienced subjects. Subjects who participate in the second and third play are called first-level experienced and sec

Sigmoidoscopy

Learning Theories,under study. Amongst other results there is the tendency to adjust settlement offers and acceptance limits by 50 Taler if they are adjusted at all the next time subjects are in the same bargaining position. Another important finding is that acceptance limits polarize at the beginning of the second p

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dissent

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Summary, the way of how subjects adjust their values. Subjects tend to offer less in the defendant’s position and ask for more in the plaintiff’s position if they have been successful, whereas they tend to put up their settlement offers in the defendant’s bargaining position and go down with their acceptanc

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