Titlebook: Legal Scholarship as a Source of Law; Fábio Perin Shecaira Book 2024Latest edition The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under

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Fábio Perin ShecairaDeals with conceptual, empirical, logical, and normative questions on the use of legal scholarship by judges.Illustrates the value of the Hartian framework for the purpose of analyzing specific aspect

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What Is a Source of Law? will be understood either as agents authorized to make law or, relatedly, as products (e.g. statutes and judicial decisions) resulting from the law-making activities of those agents. Two other possible conceptions of sources of law will be rejected with the intention of avoiding persistent jurispru

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Sources and Reasonsent reasons for action (a Hartian concept). Sources of law are things (such as documents and practices) systematically treated by judges as providing content-independent reasons for deciding legal cases one way or another. Hart’s notion of content-independence is revisited and defended from criticis

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Legal Scholarship as a Source of Law likely to serve the function of a source of law in modern municipal legal systems. This type of scholarship will be called “standard” legal scholarship; it might also be described as “l(fā)egal dogmatics,” a term more commonly used in the civil law world. The chapter goes on to discuss—and reject—some

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Normative Questions To be sure, it does not give very precise answers to the questions, if, when, and how scholarship ought to be used in judicial argument. Jurisdictions differ significantly with respect to (among other things) reliability of available scholarly work and judicial ability to understand and apply schol