Titlebook: Leadership, Institutions and Enforcement; Anti-Corruption Agen Slobodan Tomi? Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 201

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Initiative

Slobodan Tomi?ggregate distribution function—its underlying ecosystem of legal and other norms, policy incentives and public administrative capacities?that?strongly influence?the extent to which it?grows in an inclusive, sustainable and resilient manner. Countries should devote at least as much policy attention a

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Theory and Methodstional theory?– the two theoretical approaches that the book will contrast in seeking to explain the observed levels of the ACAs’ de facto autonomy. Thereafter, the chapter sets out a concept of enforcement style which will serve to gauge the de facto autonomy of the five ACAs. The final part of the

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Serbia (Case Study 1): Anticorruption Council (Council)enjoyed structural insulation from government, the Council nevertheless managed to advance and sustain high de facto autonomy. Its commissioners espoused a crafty reputational management, which propped up an aggressive operational style. The findings offer support to the reputational hypothesis, whi

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抵押貸款

Macedonia (Case Study 4): State Commission for Prevention of Corruption (SCPC)ts de facto autonomy, which coincided with a major leadership change. The reputational management of SCPC leaders is found to be an important factor in pursing the observed levels of autonomy and the preventative ACA model played a facilitating role for those leaders who opted for harsh enforcement

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Croatia (Case Study 5): Bureau for the Suppression of Organised Crime and Corruption (USKOK)ional evolution and enforcement patterns. The empirical analysis will show that, as a suppressive ACA, the USKOK could not develop the harshest form of enforcement pattern, until it received stronger organisational powers in the criminal procedure and bigger organisational resources. The chapter rev

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Comparative Analysisganisational factors and agency leaders in shaping agency enforcement. The analysis shows that the ACAs’ leaders trumped structural insulation in determining the ACAs’ de facto autonomy. The analysis also shows that the organisational model played an important role in mediating the leaders’ decision

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