Titlebook: Knowledge and Infallibility; J. L. Evans Textbook 1978Latest edition J. L. Evans 1978 David Hume.experience.George Berkeley.imagination.in

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Knowledge and Perception,e chief reason for the prolonged attack on perception and the attempt to discredit it as a possible source of knowledge. We have already seen how Plato attempted to relegate perception to the sphere of belief on the grounds that the things which are accessible to the senses are subject to constant c

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Acquaintance and Intuition,l’s well-known distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. This is discussed at length by Russell in . (London: Longman, 1918) pp. 209 ff., and more concisely in . (The Home University Library, 1912; Oxford University Press, 1946), Ch. 5. Not only does it form the bas

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Knowledge and Belief,and some of the things which many philosophers say when they theorise about knowledge. Thus, I have defended our widespread practice of being prepared to consider, and sometimes to concede, knowledge claims in a variety of subjects, such as history, botany, chemistry, etc., as well as in everyday ci

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Knowledge and Infallibility, a given proposition is true, the proposition may be true and may be false; if, however, someone knows that a given proposition is true, then the proposition . true. In this sense, knowledge and truth are inextricably linked in a way in which belief and truth are not.

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Some Problems about Knowledge,ring out the essential features of knowledge and enable us to distinguish it from related notions with which it might be confused. There are, however, several reasons why this natural expectation must remain unsatisfied.

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Knowing as a Mental State,e’ (and perhaps both). In Chapter 7 we have already rejected the first alternative, that knowing is a mental act; I now propose to show that the second alternative, that knowing is some sort of mental state or mental attitude, must also be rejected.