Titlebook: Kinetics of Reactions in Ionic Systems; Proceedings of an In T. J. Gray (Director),V. D. Fréchette Conference proceedings 1969 Springer Sci

爭議的蘋果

H. J. Oelrocedures. The . paper is restricted to games with transferable utility, while . considers general NTU games. . and . consider bargaining in a spatial context where the problem is which location to choose. . provides a theoretical analysis whereas . present experimental results obtained in this sett

notion

W. M. Robertson,F. E. Ekstroma unanimity game, i.e., the players simultaneously determine their price offers. A contract results only if a seller and the buyer have chosen the same prices. As it is typical for bargaining games, the game has many equilibrium points. We apply the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selte

Mast-Cell

R. H. Conditare determined in a series of games in which the antagonistic parties are free to choose, simultaneously, between offensive and defensive force structures given the DEH were true..In this second part, a model is considered in which both antagonists, after having chosen offensive force structures ind

invade

A. H. Feingold,J. M. Blakely,Che-Yu Liction. contains game equilibrium models focussing on social and political interaction within communities or states or between states, i.e. national and international social and political interaction. Specific aspects of those interactions are modelled as non-cooperative games and their equilibria ar

中世紀(jì)

催眠

FIN

刺耳的聲音

investigate

Grain Boundary Grooving at a Solid-Solid Interface,rfacial tension has been calculated from the kinetics constant using measured solubilities and published values of the diffusivities and it agrees well with the value obtained from equilibrium shape measurements. The relevance of these results to considerations of the thermal stability of dispersed systems are discussed.

CHASM