Titlebook: Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964; C. W. Braddick Book 2004 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 200

Expressly

項(xiàng)目

整體

法律的瑕疵

,Wishful thinking: Japan’s public debate on the Sino-Soviet relationship, 1950–62,s the ‘bad miscalculation… [of] Western European propaganda’.. Indeed, in contrast to the press, many intellectuals both ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’, claimed that the Chinese and Soviets were now a ‘strong coalition’ . and even of ‘one flesh’ ..

LURE

緩解

,Leaning to one side: Japanese diplomacy and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950–60,o two antagonistic blocs. Each superpower was able to exploit its hegemonic status to impose loyalty within its own bloc: increasing the costs of defection by encouraging economic and strategic dependence.

出沒

,Fishing in troubled waters: Japanese trade and the Sino-Soviet economic schism, 1960–64,more than three hundred agreements, leaving innumerable projects incomplete. Coming amidst the ruins of Mao Zedong’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ and a series of climatic disasters, this was a heavy blow indeed.

AVOW

,Independent thinking: Japanese civil society and the open Sino-Soviet split, 1962–64,ct in Tokyo was immediate, ‘the dispute… [came] to attract an interest incomparably greater than before.’. A flood of articles appeared, dominating the headlines and academic journals throughout the next 18 months (Figure 9.1).

膽汁

洞穴

,Fire across the sea: Japanese security and the Sino-Soviet strategic rift, 1960–64,credibility in the Free World.’ However, at the same time he also wanted Japan to ‘become a country that will be taken seriously by the Chinese Communists, that will not be easily manipulated by them… We are watching China carefully and quietiy.’. The Japanese public expected no less..