Titlebook: James M. Buchanan; A Theorist of Politi Richard E. Wagner Book 2018 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 public choice.mora

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What Should Economists Do Now?s. Criticizing the preference-satisfaction criterion of neoclassical economics, Buchanan argues that the central concern of economics should be to design and maintain institutions that allow individuals as much opportunity as possible to make their own choices and to engage in voluntary cooperation.

Climate

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James Buchanan and the Properly Trained Economisty, it takes varied iterations to force alien concepts upon reluctant minds. What he regarded as the role of the properly trained economist is just a variation on his understanding of constitutional political economy. According to Buchanan, properly trained economists occupy dual, roles as economic s

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James Buchanan and the “New Economics of Order” Research Programmy as a contextual approach to socio-economic reality, a tradition in which James Buchanan was socialized and to which he was a life-long contributor. The historical mainline extends from classical political economy to ordoliberalism, and shows how contextual economics has gained relevance in period

neutral-posture

Emergence, Equilibrium, and Agent-Based Modeling: Updating James Buchanan’s Democratic Political Ecoodeling. To be sure, Hayek could not have worked with agent-based models because that platform did not exist when Hayek was developing his ideas about the distribution and use of knowledge in society. All the same, Vriend explained convincingly that Hayek could have made good use of the agent-based

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The Conflict Between Constitutionally Constraining the State and Empowering the State to Provide Pubovements, namely “genuinely public goods of the pure Samuelsonian type.” However, even the most benevolent government agents cannot improve on imperfect market outcomes in the presence of free-rider or demand-revelation problems because—being human and not omniscient—they cannot know the public’s tr

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Fiscal Constitutions, Institutional Congruence, and the Organization of Governmentscompare, choose, and migrate, and thus force their government in tax competition to administer their money with due care. In our contribution to this book, we argue that a solid financial architecture requires institutional congruence. The power and responsibility for taxation, expenditures, and deb

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Constitution

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Inconsistencies in?the Finance of?Public Services: Government Responses to?Excess Demand by general taxation. Citizens (as ‘consumers’) increase their demand for services, even though citizens (as ‘voters’) are reticent to increase taxation. Buchanan invited readers to explore the impact of different assumptions of politicians’ behaviour. In this chapter, attention focuses on the way t