Titlebook: Internet and Network Economics; 7th International Wo Ning Chen,Edith Elkind,Elias Koutsoupias Conference proceedings 2011 Springer-Verlag G

Traumatic-Grief

Optimal Pricing in Social Networks with Incomplete Informationuation, and linearly additive influences from other agents. We study the incomplete information case where agents know a common distribution about others’ private valuations, and make decisions simultaneously. The “rational behavior” of agents in this case is captured by the well-known Bayesian Nash

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commensurate

歌唱隊(duì)

A Global Characterization of Envy-Free Truthful Scheduling of Two Tasksstigate the allocation functions that are both weakly monotone (truthful) and locally efficient (envy-free), in the case of only two tasks, but . players. We show that the only allocation functions that satisfy both conditions are affine minimizers, with strong restrictions on the parameters of the

Ointment

Truth, Envy, and Truthful Market Clearing Bundle Pricingof valuations for which one can design such auctions. Surprisingly, we also show that minor modifications to these valuations lead to impossibility results, the most surprising of which is that for a natural class of valuations, one cannot achieve efficiency, truthfulness, envy freeness, individual

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Simple, Optimal and Efficient Auctionshe optimality of the second price auction with monopoly reserves when the bidders’ values are drawn i.i.d. from regular distributions [12], and its approximate optimality when they are drawn from independent regular distributions [11], we focus our attention to the second price auction with general

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性行為放縱者

tolerance

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