Titlebook: Information Theoretic Security; Third International Reihaneh Safavi-Naini Conference proceedings 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 20

APEX

Cerebrovascular

Does Physical Security of Cryptographic Devices Need a Formal Study? (Invited Talk)y thing the adversary can do is to query the cryptographic algorithm on inputs of its choice and analyze the responses, which are always computed according to the correct original secret information. However, such a model does not always correspond to the realities of physical implementations.

無(wú)能的人

LIEN

Statistical Security Conditions for Two-Party Secure Function Evaluation model paradigm is often replaced by an information-theoretic security definition. At EUROCRYPT 2006, we showed that most of these definitions had some weaknesses, and presented new information-theoretic conditions that were equivalent to a simulation-based definition in the real/ideal model. Howeve

類人猿

achlorhydria

Theory of Quantum Key Distribution: The Road Ahead (Invited Talk)protocol, what is left to do? As a basis of my talk, I will present the ideas of quantum key distribution in a language that emphasizes the common basis with information theoretic secure key distribution schemes that are based on independent noise assumptions in channels. As I will show, the role qu

救護(hù)車

Devastate

Perfectly Reliable and Secure Communication Tolerating Static and Mobile Mixed Adversaryxed adversary, where the adversary can be either static or mobile. The . and . are three important parameters of any interactive PRMT/PSMT protocol and are well studied in the literature in the presence of a static/mobile Byzantine adversary. However, in the presence of a mixed adversary, we encount

蘑菇

一起平行

Efficient Traitor Tracing from Collusion Secure Codesuipped with a black-box tracing procedure against pirates that are allowed to decrypt with some (possibly high) error rate while keeping the decoders of the lowest possible size when using collusion secure codes, namely of size proportional to the length of Tardos’ code.