Titlebook: Information Security; 6th International Co Colin Boyd,Wenbo Mao Conference proceedings 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 PKI infr

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恃強(qiáng)凌弱

Cabg318

Unconditionally Secure Homomorphic Pre-distributed Bit Commitment and Secure Two-Party Computationspropose very efficient protocols for implementing addition and multiplication over .(.). Differently than in previous works, in our protocol each step of the computation is verifiable. Moreover, no copying of commitments is necessary, because commitments are not destroyed during the computation. Als

olfction

The Design and Implementation of Protocol-Based Hidden Key Recovery the following novel features: (1) The Key recovery channels are “unfilterable” — the key recovery channels cannot be removed without also breaking correct operation of the protocol. (2) Protocol implementations containing our key recovery designs can inter-operate with standard (uncompromised) prot

祖?zhèn)髫?cái)產(chǎn)

BILL

On the Security of Fair Non-repudiation Protocolsled by several inherent design weaknesses, which also apply to other non-repudiation protocols. To prevent these attacks, we propose generic countermeasures that considerably strengthen the design and implementation of non-repudiation protocols. The application of these countermeasures is finally sh

不規(guī)則

祖?zhèn)?/a>

Zero-Value Point Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystemd a variant of DPA using the point (0,.), which is not randomized in Jacobian coordinates or in the isomorphic class. This point often exists in the standard curves, and we have to care this attack. In this paper, we propose the zero-value point attack as an extension of Goubin’s attack. Note that e

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thrombus