Titlebook: Industrial Organization, Antitrust, and Public Policy; John V. Craven Book 1983 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1983 Industrial

灰姑娘

Dictation

Industrial Organization and Technological Change: Recent Econometric Findingsh and development (R&D) expenditures, major innovations, and the rate of diffusion of innovations. In the opening sections of this chapter, I shall summarize the principal results of some recent econometric investigations of this sort.

labile

Micro Determinants of Conglomerate Mergers mergers are conglomerate in nature, though not necessarily purely conglomerate. Such acquisitions present especially vexing policy problems. Conglomerate mergers are difficult to attack on anticompetitive grounds; yet, they may threaten the competitive nature of the economy through their impact on aggregate concentration.

Fester

The Relevance of Industrial Organizationanizing principles for the field we refer to as industrial organization. The organizing principle was the trinity — market structure, behavior, and performance; the basic premise, that the first of these, structure, is the conditioning, causal variable, the influence of which can be traced in the be

pineal-gland

迫擊炮

Antitrust Enforcement: Where it has been; Where it is Goingtrust as an anachronism, and openly counsel that it be abolished. But some hold the opposite view. They urge that antitrust enforcement be strengthened, and recall the Warren Court years with nostalgia.

劇本

An Evaluation of Horizontal Merger Enforcementcality; it symbolized renewed congressional concern and vigorous commitment to the preservation of competitive markets and the prevention of monopoly power. As a result of the 1950 amendment one commentator was moved to write, “Thus, over 40 years after the enactment of the Clayton Act, it now becom

有助于

Toward a Broader Concept of Competition Policyun and rival-oriented market power), the focus is exclusively on the first two. In addition, interrelationships between long-run and short-run market power are described. The reach of antitrust policy with respect to the two types of market power is discussed in the second section. This consists of

AXIS

GOAD