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Titlebook: Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing; A Game-theoretic App Youqi Li,Fan Li,Chuan Zhang Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and T

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書目名稱Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing
副標(biāo)題A Game-theoretic App
編輯Youqi Li,Fan Li,Chuan Zhang
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/464/463207/463207.mp4
概述Clarifying the equilibrium analysis for incentive mechanism in mobile crowdsensing.Providing game-theoretic solutions for designing incentive mechanism in more practical mobile crowdsensing.Understand
叢書名稱SpringerBriefs in Computer Science
圖書封面Titlebook: Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing; A Game-theoretic App Youqi Li,Fan Li,Chuan Zhang Book 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and T
描述.Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is emerging as a novel sensing paradigm in the Internet of Things (IoTs) due to the proliferation of smart devices (e.g., smartphones, wearable devices) in people’s daily lives. These ubiquitous devices provide an opportunity to harness the wisdom of crowds by recruiting mobile users to collectively perform sensing tasks, which largely collect data about a wide range of human activities and the surrounding environment. However, users suffer from resource consumption such as battery, processing power, and storage, which discourages users’ participation. To ensure the participation rate, it is necessary to employ an incentive mechanism to compensate users’ costs such that users are willing to take part in crowdsensing...This book sheds light on the design of incentive mechanisms for MCS in the context of game theory. Particularly, this book presents several game-theoretic models for MCS in different scenarios. In Chapter 1, the authors present an overview of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive
出版日期Book 2024
關(guān)鍵詞Mobile crowdsourcing; Data collection; Incentive mechanism; Game theory; Stackelberg game; Pricing; Mobile
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-6921-0
isbn_softcover978-981-99-6920-3
isbn_ebook978-981-99-6921-0Series ISSN 2191-5768 Series E-ISSN 2191-5776
issn_series 2191-5768
copyrightThe Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapor
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Collaborative Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing,orm’s payoff maximization in polynomial time. The numerical results show that: (1) the cooperation with App brings long-term and sufficient participation; the optimal strategies reduce the platform’s tasks cost as well as improve App’s revenues.
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2191-5768 view of MCS and state the significance of incentive mechanism for MCS. Then, in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5, the authors propose a long-term incentive mechanism, a fair incentive mechanism, a collaborative incentive978-981-99-6920-3978-981-99-6921-0Series ISSN 2191-5768 Series E-ISSN 2191-5776
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