Titlebook: Immanence and Illusion in Sartre’s Ontology of Consciousness; Caleb Heldt Book 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 J

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49552-7Jean-Paul Sartre; phenomenological ontology; negation; reflection; illusions; Hegel; Bergson; immanence; tra

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Book 2020 such a reinterpretation. ?In doing so, a philosophical inquiry emerges which is genuinely contemporary in its aim and scope and which seeks to demonstrate the significance of Sartre’s thought, not only as significant to the history of philosophy, but to ongoing debates in continental philosophy and

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Immanence and Illusion in Sartre’s Ontology of Consciousness

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Being, Nothingness and Becoming, to which Sartre’s own viewpoint is situated. Indeed, these two perspectives provide the ground for what Sartre takes to be the foundational points of view governing the vast majority of conscious human experience, namely the unreflective and the reflective, respectively represented at this level by

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Pre-Reflective Consciousness and (Non-)Thetic Awareness,is chapter seeks to demonstrate the theoretical genealogy of pre-reflective consciousness and non-thetic awareness with respect to some of Sartre’s more significant philosophical influences, in particular Descartes, Kant, and Husserl. It is the emphasis placed upon the pre-reflective, non-thetic dim

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Transcendent (Non-)Thetic Awareness,conscious awareness; which is to say, to the . dimensions of (non-)thetic awareness. In the analyses of worldly, psychic and bodily awareness which are addressed in this chapter may be found the basic outlines of what respectively may be called Sartre’s phenomenology of perception, his ‘egology’ or

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Time-Consciousness: Psychic and Transcendental,divergent modes of psychic or egological time-consciousness, each of which aligns with the distinction laid out by Bergson in . between what Bergson takes to be, on the one hand, the illicit spatialization of duration—which he refers to as a ‘multiplicity of juxtaposition’ or a ‘discrete multiplicit