| 書目名稱 | Human Thought | | 編輯 | Joseph Mendola | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/430/429546/429546.mp4 | | 叢書名稱 | Philosophical Studies Series | | 圖書封面 |  | | 描述 | Conscious experience and thought content are customarilytreated as distinct problems. This book argues that they are not. PartOne develops a chastened empiricist theory of content, which cedes toexperience a crucial role in rooting the contents of thoughts, butdeploys an expanded conception of experience and of the ways in whichcontents may be rooted in experience. Part Two shows how, were theworld as we experience it to be, our neurophysiology would besufficient to constitute capacities for the range of intuitivethoughts recognized by Part One. Part Three argues that physics hasshown that our experience is not veridical, and that this implies thatno completely plausible account of how we have thoughts iscomprehensible by humans. Yet this leaves thoughts not especiallysuspect, because such considerations also imply that all positive andcontingent human conceptions of anything are false. | | 出版日期 | Book 1997 | | 關(guān)鍵詞 | 15th century; Enzo Paci; agents; argue; concept; event; experience; humans; physics; quantum mechanics; skepti | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5660-8 | | isbn_softcover | 978-0-7923-4402-5 | | isbn_ebook | 978-94-011-5660-8Series ISSN 0921-8599 Series E-ISSN 2542-8349 | | issn_series | 0921-8599 | | copyright | Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997 |
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