Titlebook: Human Action, Deliberation and Causation; Jan Bransen,Stefaan E. Cuypers Book 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1998 determin

endoscopy

Freedom in Belief and Desire, they make corresponding assumptions about their belief-forming capacities. They assume that they are generally responsive to what they think they ought to believe in the things they actually come to believe. In much the same sense, people ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought

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Goodwill, Determinism and Justification take into consideration these other people, their well-being, their ways of life, their values and their projects. We try to avoid harming them when we enter a crowded place, we try to be decent to most of them and we try to be a good friend to some of them, and so on. Because we are capable of doi

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Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behaviora vending machine. Just as coins are in (or get deposited in) vending machines, beliefs, desires, and intentions are in us. Just as the right coins deposited in the machine cause the machine to behave in a certain way — to yield its contents: cokes, cigarettes, or candy, as the case may be — so the

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The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist Theoryises if we accept that the physical world is causally closed or ‘complete’ — i.e. that every physical effect is completely fixed by its physical causes alone — and that there are mental causes of physical effects too. How can mental causes have physical effects if those effects are not overdetermine

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What We Do: A Nonreductive Approach to Human Actiontry to give a nonreductive and nondualistic answer to this question. First, I shall simply present a view of human action that allows a straightforward answer to Wittgenstein’s question, and then show how this view of human action fits into a general conception of what a human person or agent is. Ne

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