Titlebook: Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory; Tamer Ba?ar,Georges Zaccour Reference work 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Na

商業(yè)上

Dynamic Games in Macroeconomicsor constructing dynamic equilibria in such models, we focus on strategic dynamic programming, which has found extensive application for solving macroeconomic models. We first start by presenting some prototypes of dynamic and stochastic games that have arisen in macroeconomics and their main challen

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Intentional

悶熱

dapper

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-0348-5151-0ea, in the context of the existence of value and uniform value, algorithms, vector payoffs, incomplete information, and imperfect state observation. Also some models related to continuous-time games, e.g., games with short-stage duration, semi-Markov games, are mentioned. Moreover, a number of appli

morale

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-11706-3erview of almost all basic streams of research in this area such as the existence of stationary Nash and correlated equilibria in models on countable and general state spaces, the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria, algorithms, stopping games, and the existence of uniform equilibria. Our survey

Crohns-disease

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-02762-1 a large number of asymptotically negligible agents modeled by controlled stochastic dynamical systems. This is achieved by exploiting the relationship between the finite and corresponding infinite limit population problems. The solution to the infinite population problem is given by (i) the Hamilto

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Brocas-Area

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