Titlebook: Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory; Tamer Ba?ar,Georges Zaccour Reference work 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Na

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Mean Field Games a large number of asymptotically negligible agents modeled by controlled stochastic dynamical systems. This is achieved by exploiting the relationship between the finite and corresponding infinite limit population problems. The solution to the infinite population problem is given by (i) the Hamilto

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Zero-Sum Differential Gamesms of a partial differential equation, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation. We discuss different classes of games: in finite horizon, in infinite horizon, and pursuit-evasion games. We also analyze differential games in which the players do not have a full information on the structure of the game or

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Game-Theoretic Learning in Distributed Controltive behaviors through local interactions and by processing local information. Applications range from autonomous vehicles to energy to transportation. One approach to control of such distributed architectures is to view the components as players in a game. In this approach, two design consideration

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Network Games major types of games, namely, congestion games, resource allocation games, diffusion games, and network formation games. Several algorithmic aspects and methodologies for analyzing such games are discussed, and connections between network games and other relevant topical areas are identified.

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Nontransferable Utility Cooperative Dynamic Gamesgame theorists. This chapter provides a coherent analysis on NTU cooperative dynamic games. The formulations of NTU cooperative dynamic games in continuous time and in discrete time are provided. The issues of individual rationality, Pareto optimality, and an individual player’s payoff under coopera

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Dynamic Games of International Pollution Control: A Selective Reviewal pollution control and more specifically on the game of climate change with one global stock of pollutants. The chapter has two main themes. First, the different noncooperative Nash equilibria (open loop, feedback, linear, nonlinear) are derived. In order to assess efficiency, the steady states ar