Titlebook: ;

減去

Michel Moisan,Jacques Pelletierfferent naturalistic account of the social nature of reasoning due to Michael Tomasello, who submits that reasoning evolved primarily for cooperative argumentation and joint or collective decision-making. I argue that Tomasello’s account may go too far in the collectivist tradition and I conclude th

施舍

Spektroskopische Untersuchungen an DyAsO4,entialism considers the basis of I-Thou sociality may be constructed. My view also challenges inferentialism, because in a non-ideal discourse that is often infused with stereotype-based exclusion and power differentials, the practiced shared perspective may belong only to the agents from the tradit

Fecundity

A New Approach to the Glass Transitiont normative proprieties implicit in pattern-governed behavior. Further, these norms implicit in pattern-governed behavior presuppose the existence of collective attitudes. It thus emerges that pattern-governed behavior must be understood as behavior . (to use Tuomela’s language). Finally, the materi

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喃喃訴苦

Introduction: Between Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality,e crucial role that collective norms and practices play in human lives; and each maintains that social attitudes or activities of sorts underlie them. But they have been barely confronted in the literature up to now. This volume brings together new essays, which tackle the issue at hand from differe

Incommensurate

Rational Golems: Collective Agents as Players in the Reasoning Gameve that holds that: (i) collective entities can behave as rational agents in our argumentative practices of giving and asking for reasons; and (ii) attributions of beliefs are interpretative tools aiming to make sense of the behaviors and perspectives of agents, and to keep track of their commitment

盲信者

慷慨援助

Hearten

Normative Mindshaping and the Normative Nicheis produced by the members of the community. The nature of this dialectical movement?– producing the framework while being produced by it?– has long been investigated; however, it is only recently that some scholars have started to appreciate the centrality of . and . for an adequate description of

ADOPT

Collective Intentionality, Inferentialism and the Capacity for Claim-Makingr false with respect to what they are about. The nature of these practices of claim-making has been studied by philosophers and psychologists alike. Furthermore, important strands in evolutionary studies have relied on both psychological and philosophical theories for addressing the question of how