Titlebook: Global Protectionism; David Greenaway,Robert C. Hine,Robert J. Thornton Book 1991 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers L

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Why Are We Negotiating on TRIMs?,s used and the sectors affected vary between economies and over time. However, the documentary evidence which is available suggests that their use has increased in recent years in less developed countries (LDCs); where developed market economies (DMEs) are concerned, the evidence is more ambiguous.

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Comment, economics of foreign direct investment (FDI) will find in this paper a succinct discussion of the nature, extent and objectives of both the incentives that host countries offer to foreign firms and the complex set of regulations they impose on their operations. This is followed by an elegant theore

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Export Restraints: Proliferation and Options for Retariffication,t specific trading partners’ import-competing industries. These export restraints are often referred to as ‘grey area measures’, barriers to trade or distortions of trade that are neither clearly banned nor expressly allowed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). None the less, the

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Graduation and Reciprocity,70s, broadly on the ground that the less-developed countries could not compete on equal terms with the more- developed. In the circumstances of the 1960s, this concession did not impose substantial actual or perceived costs (economic or political) on the developed countries. The current Uruguay Roun

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J.A. Hobson as a Political Theorist,war period international trade has increased to an extraordinary degree — a 40-fold increase in value terms between 1950 and 1987, and a 10-fold increase in volume terms over the same period. Moreover, the growth in trade has consistently outstripped the growth of output over this period. Between th

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T. H. Martin,A. H. Guenther,M. KristiansenNTBs) for manufacturing in the United States in the post-Tokyo Round period. In the process of doing so, we shall compare and contrast our findings with those of earlier studies. Our second objective is to explain the current pattern of protection and the reasons for its evolution over the past twen

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https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230346482ade or decade and a half, and builds on and extends the previous work by Professor Ray on the same topic. My comments are organised into four parts: (1) summary of the most important results of the paper; (2) examination of some (perhaps inevitable) econometric weaknesses of the paper; (3) possible