Titlebook: Games in Management Science; Essays in Honor of G Pierre-Olivier Pineau,Simon Sigué,Sihem Taboubi Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

Allege

pericardium

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8348-9383-3re particularly, we introduce the impact of prices on one of the factors that affect the diffusion of new products: the innovation coefficient. By doing so, we relax one of the hypotheses in the existing literature stating that this rate is constant. In order to assess the impact of this functional

分開(kāi)

Problems with Rule Descriptions of Language,acturer, two-retailer channel and develop a two-period model where consumers’ preferences are distributed along a Hotelling line. The rebate consists in a price discount that can be redeemed on the second period. We solve three Stackelberg games: a benchmark where no rebate is offered, a symmetric g

描繪

H. van Honten,C. W. J. Beenakkercally integrated firms, whenever this is efficient for firms. This is particularly relevant when the vertical externality provokes distortions in the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D or advertising. The present model illustrates the possibility of using two-part tariffs endogenously defined as lin

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erythema

Analogue Electronics for Higher Studiese selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively

Maximizer

Introduction: A New Instrument of Science?, a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where . coalitions exist and behave as . players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperati

pessimism

會(huì)議

Abstimmungsmacht in Unternehmen,tions in three sections. The first group of contributions compares the observed behavior to different cooperative and noncooperative theoretical benchmarks. The second group covers contributions that design experiments that aim to find behavioral support for the use of specific types of strategies.