Titlebook: Games and Dynamics in Economics; Essays in Honor of A Ferenc Szidarovszky,Gian Italo Bischi Book 2020 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 20

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Properties of Linear Time-Dependent Systemsication is reachability which can drive the state of the system to a given desired state in any future time. In this study we elaborate a generalisation of the Kalman-type rank conditions which provide the sufficient and necessary conditions for reachability of such systems.

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Medium: An International Peace Court,properties of the model, showing that if the demand for skilled labor is higher than its supply, then innovative firms may have an incentive to become non-innovative and stop hiring skilled workers. If, by contrast, the supply of skilled labor is higher than its demand, then there could be incentive

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Mally Shechory Bitton,Donya Hawa-Kamelponentially discounts older data. Also adaptive expectations can be expressed as weighted sums of infinitely many past states, with exponentially decreasing weights, but these are not averages since the weights do not sum up?to one for any given initial time. These two different kinds of learning, w

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William Becker,William Greene,Sherwin Rosen only look at the recent success of the available trading rules. We show that the introduction of this kind of imitators makes the results more complicated but even more realistic. In particular, under some specific circumstances, imitators may stabilize an otherwise unstable market or, at the oppos

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7505-8eans that our model is a three-country extension of Kaldor’s nonlinear business cycle model that is characterized by the dynamic interaction of the real income and the real capital stock. It is supposed that three countries are connected through international trade and international capital movement

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An Introduction to Chemoinformaticshe capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth mixed duopoly game and determine the solution of the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nash-equilibrium exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike the production-to-order case, the equilibr